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THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE PREFERRED-POSITION DEBATE,
1941-1946
David P. Currie*
While the Supreme Court grappled with questions arising out of the Sec-
ond World War,' ordinary life went on. In a large number of decisions more
remote from the emotions and uncertainties of war, the Court cemented the
gains of the New Deal revolution and made further progress in defining the
contours of civil rights and liberties that it had begun to draw under the
leadership of Chief Justice Hughes.2
In addressing the familiar economic issues that had dominated the docket
before that revolution,' the Justices largely confirmed the Washington Post's
sunny prediction that " 'for years to come there would be virtual unanimity
on the tribunal.' "' None of the Brethren objected when, in Wickard v. Fil-
burn,' a congressional limitation of the wheat a farmer could plant for his
own use was upheld under the commerce clause, even though the transac-
tion was neither interstate nor commerce.6 None complained when in
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The author wishes to thank
the Catholic University Law School, where this paper and that next cited formed the basis of
the Pope John XXIII Lecture in April of 1987, and Geoffrey R. Stone for helpful criticism.
1. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court.- The Second World War, 1941-
1946, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Stone I].
2. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil Rights and Liberties, 1930-
1941, 1987 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Hughes II].
3. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court.- The New Deal, 1930-1941, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 504 (1987) [hereinafter Hughes I].
4. G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 204 (1977) (citation to
original source not provided).
5. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
6. "[I]f we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it
which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in
this sense competes with wheat in commerce." Id. at 128 (Jackson, J., for a unanimous
Court); see also A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., over a
dissent by Roberts, J.) (holding Fair Labor Standards Act's wage and hour regulations applied,
i.e., to elevator operators in building whose tenants manufactured goods for interstate ship-
ment); Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV.
321, 324-34 (1946); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946 (pt. 2),
59 HARV. L. REV. 883, 901-09 (1946) (applauding the decision).
The Court also unanimously held that Congress could regulate insurance despite three-
quarters of a century of unpersuasive precedent that it was not commerce even if interstate.
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Carolene Products Co. v. United States,7 the second Carolene Products deci-
sion, due process objections to a ban on interstate transportation of "filled"
milk, after the addition of vitamins had eliminated any legitimate health
concern, were rejected on the ground that it was "disputable" whether mere
regulation could remove the danger of confusing it with "the natural prod-
uct." The methods employed in the exercise of congressional powers, wrote
Justice Reed in the latter case, "are beyond attack without a clear and con-
vincing showing that there is no rational basis for the legislation."'
However, in the first Carolene Products decision, United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,9 Justice Stone had suggested that the Court might more
strictly scrutinize measures falling "within a specific prohibition ... such as
those of the first ten amendments," or "restrict[ing] those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion," or directed against "discrete and insular minorities." The civil rights
and civil liberties decisions of the 1930's seemed to bear out this sugges-
tion.' ° In grappling with cases in Stone's preferred categories, however,
great differences of opinion developed among Justices who had been unani-
See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868), discussed in D. CURRIE, THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 352 (1985). In a companion
case, four Justices insisted, however, that Congress could do so only because insurance affected
interstate commerce, thereby avoiding a disruption of established schemes of state regulation.
See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944) (Black, J.,
writing for four of the seven participating Justices) (holding Sherman Act applied to insur-
ance). But see id. at 562-83 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); id. at 583-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
id. at 584-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J.) (applying the theory of the South-Eastern dissenters to uphold application of
the National Labor Relations Act to an insurer); Powell, Insurance As Commerce in Constitu-
tion and Statute, 57 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1944) (agreeing with the dissenters in South-Eastern).
When Congress in the McCarran Act intervened to restore any state authority taken away
by the South-Eastern decision, the Court predictably upheld the statute, see Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946) (Rutledge, J., noting that to hold otherwise "would
invert the constitutional grant into a limitation upon the very power it confers"), as it had
upheld similar statutes removing commerce clause barriers to state regulation since the 1890's,
see, e.g., Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court.- The Protection of Economic Interests,
1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 361-62 (1985) [hereinafter Fuller I] (discussing In re
Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891)), despite indefensible contrary decisions respecting the analogous
limitation found implicit in article III's grant of admiralty jurisdiction, see, e.g., Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), discussed in Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: 1910-1921, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1144 [hereinafter White].
7. 323 U.S. 18, 21-22, 28-29 (1944).
8. Id. at 31-32. Justices Black and Douglas concurred only in the result, presumably
because they thought economic due process should have been disowned altogether. Id. at 32.
See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (Douglas, J., enunciating an even more hands-off
approach).
9. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), discussed in Hughes I, supra note 3, at 546.
10. See Hughes II, supra note 2, passim.
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mous in upholding ordinary economic legislation.'"
I. THE OPENING OF THE RIFT
A. Obstructing Justice
Soon after Stone became Chief Justice, differences of opinion among the
Justices erupted in Bridges v. California, 12 where the Court split five to four
over the constitutionality of contempt convictions for statements allegedly
interfering with the administration of justice in pending cases. Justice Black
wrote for the majority to set aside the convictions on freedom of expression
grounds.13 Justice Frankfurter, joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justices
Roberts and Byrnes, wrote for the dissenters.' 4 It was a battle of giants and
a preview of things to come.
In part, the difference between the opinions of Black and Frankfurter lay
in their varying assessments of the facts. The President of the International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union had published a telegram
warning of a crippling strike if a court order was enforced. The Los Angeles
Times had published an editorial urging a judge not to place named offend-
ers on probation."5 To Frankfurter, both publications were "attempt[s] to
overawe a judge in a matter immediately pending before him."' 6 To Black
they were essentially harmless since the Times editorial "did no more than
threaten future adverse criticism which was reasonably to be expected any-
way in the event of a lenient disposition of the pending case" and Bridges'
telegram had told the judge nothing he could not be assumed to have known
before. 17
Yet the differences between the majority and dissenting Justices ran
deeper. They quarreled, to begin with, over the weight to be given to history
in interpreting the speech and press guarantees. Justice Frankfurter insisted
11. For statistical demonstration of this fractiousness, see C. PRITCHETT, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES 1937-1947 (1948).
12. 314 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1941).
13. Id. at 258-78.
14. Id. at 279-305 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 298-302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 279 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter noted: "A powerful newspaper
brought its full coercive power to bear [on a judge, whose continuance in office was dependent
upon securing popular approval within a year], in demanding a particular sentence." Id. at
300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He continued that it would be "inadmissible dogmatism" to
say that publication of the telegram (which the state supreme court regarded "as 'a threat that
if an attempt was made to enforce the decision, the ports of the entire Pacific Coast would be
tied up' ") could not have "dominated the mind" of the state court judge. Id. at 302 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 273, 278.
19871
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that "the power to punish for contempt for intrusions into the living process
of adjudication ha[d] been an unquestioned characteristic of English courts
and of the courts of this country" for over 200 years;' 8 Black retorted that
the first amendment had been adopted in order to disavow "oppressive Eng-
lish restrictions" and that "untested state decisions" were not
determinative. 9
The Justices also differed as to the substantive standard by which the
state's action was to be judged. Noting that the contempt citations in
Bridges rested not upon a legislative determination entitled to deference
under Gitlow v. New York,2 but on the common law, Justice Black took the
occasion to enshrine the famous "clear and present danger" test, which had
begun to crop up again in the late 1930's, in its most protective form: "the
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence ex-
tremely high before utterances can be punished."2 1 Justice Frankfurter, who
thought it enough, as the state court had held, that the publications had a
" 'reasonable tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of jus-
tice,' " commented that "[t]he phrase 'clear and present danger' is merely a
justification for curbing utterance where that is warranted by the substantive
evil to be prevented... and the literary difference between it and 'reasonable
tendency' is not of constitutional dimension. '"22
The majority and the dissenters also differed in the relative importance
they accorded to the competing values of free speech and fair trial. Justice
Black emphasized that punishment of the utterances in question would pre-
clude discussion of matters of great public importance at a crucial time,2"
18. Id. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 290 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(invoking Justice Holmes' decision upholding a similar conviction in Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)), discussed in Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court. Full
Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1890-1910, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 867, 871-72 (1985) [hereinafter
Fuller II].
19. 314 U.S. at 265, 268 & n.13 (dismissing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907),
on the ground-which Holmes had refused to take-that the Court had not yet held first
amendment limitations applicable to the states); see Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (expressly as-
suming that state was forbidden to abridge freedom of expression).
20. 268 U.S. 652 (1925), discussed in Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
1921-1930, 1986 DUKE L.J. 65, 82-88 [hereinafter Taft].
21. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 260-63. For the earlier career of this standard, see White, supra
note 6, at 1145-55; Hughes II, supra note 2; Taft, supra note 20, at 82-91.
22. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 295-96 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Holmes had said much the
same thing in Patterson: "If a court regards, as it may, a publication concerning a matter of
law pending before it, as tending toward such an interference, it may punish it .... 205 U.S.
at 463; see also Hanson, The Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press and Contempt by Publica-
tion, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 165 (1942) (highlighting this disagreement and applauding Justice
Black).
23. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 268.
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while Justice Frankfurter noted that "[the] administration of justice by an
impartial judiciary" was "basic to our conception of freedom."24 Finally,
while there was no hint of either judicial restraint or federalism in Justice
Black's opinion, Justice Frankfurter invoked both "the presumption of valid-
ity" and the "duty to give due regard ... to the state's power to deal with
what may be essentially local situations."25 In short, some of the New Deal
Justices seemed much more willing than others to set aside measures affect-
ing freedom of expression, and among the more reluctant in Bridges was
Chief Justice Stone.26
B. Picketing
In a final burst of unanimity that closed the Hughes era, Justice Murphy's
maiden opinion in Thornhill v. Alabama,27 assimilating freedom of speech to
Carolene Products' preferred category of devices for the democratic correc-
tion of error, had struck down as overbroad a state statute read essentially to
forbid all labor picketing. 28 Less than one year later, however, that unanim-
ity had vanished as Justices Black, Douglas, and Reed dissented in Milk
24. Id. at 268-69, 282 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 293 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter added: "We must be fas-
tidiously careful not to make our private views the measure of constitutional authority." Id.
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
26. Bridges also presented interesting technical problems to which Justice Black did not
advert, though the dissenters prominently called attention to some of them. See id. at 280
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (protesting that "[w]e are not even vouchsafed reference to the
specific provision of the Constitution" on which the majority relied). Bridges was an alien and
the owner of the Times was a corporation; neither was a "citizen" protected by the privileges
or immunities clause, which Justice Black was later to suggest made the first amendment appli-
cable to the states. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). Earlier decisions had placed freedom of expression within the due process clause. See
Hughes II, supra note 2. However, as Justice Frankfurter argued, without adverting to Gros-
jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (a case in which the Court had ignored the
problem in striking down a tax restricting the press freedom of corporations), there was au-
thority to the effect that corporations-which Black had once iconoclastically denied were
"persons" for due process purposes, see Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, 85-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting)-had no "liberty" within the meaning of that
clause. Finally, the actions complained of in Bridges were those of judges rather than legisla-
tors; if the theory was that the fourteenth amendment made the first amendment applicable to
the states, it should have been food for thought that the latter ("Congress shall make no law")
seemed to limit only legislative action.
27. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
28. Id. at 95-96 ("Mere legislative preference for one rather than another means for com-
batting substantive evils. . . may well prove an inadequate foundation on which to rest regula-
tions which are aimed at or in their operation diminish the effective exercise of rights so
necessary to the maintenance of democratic institutions."), discussed in Hughes II, supra note
2; see also AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., over two dissents arguing
only that the issue was not properly presented) (holding without much explanation that the
state could not ban all organizational picketing: "The right of free communication cannot ...
19871
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Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,2 9 a decision that upheld
an injunction against peaceful picketing that Justice Frankfurter said could
justifiably be found coercive because of "the momentum of fear generated by
past violence." 3 As in Bridges, the disagreement in Milk Wagon turned in
part upon differing assessments of the facts.31 Furthermore, Justice Frank-
furter once again emphasized deference to the state courts while Justice
Black continued to insist on the need to find a "clear and present danger" of
harm.32 Justice Reed, moreover, went further by noting that "[i]f the fear
engendered by past misconduct coerces storekeepers during peaceful picket-
ing, the remedy lies in the maintenance of order, not in denial of free
speech."33
This basic disagreement between the Justices flared up again in two pick-
eting cases decided soon after Stone became Chief Justice. In the first,
Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 34 the Court, in another Frank-
furter opinion, upheld an injunction against picketing a restaurant in viola-
tion of a state antitrust law over dissents by Justices Black, Douglas,
Murphy, and Reed. The picketers' only quarrel with the restaurant owner
was that he had hired a contractor who employed nonunion labor to con-
struct another building less than two miles away. To hold this picketing
constitutionally protected, wrote Frankfurter, "would compel the states to
allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode to conscript neutrals
having no relation to either the dispute or the industry in which it arose."'35
However, in the second case, Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802
v. Wohl, 3 6 which was decided the same day as Ritter's Cafe, the Court unani-
mously set aside an injunction against the picketing of bakeries because of a
be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not
in his employ.").
29. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
30. Id. at 293, 294 (adding that "utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance
as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force").
31. See id. at 313-16 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is going a long way
to say that because of the acts of these few men, six thousand other members of their union can
be denied the right to express their opinion .... "); cf. id. at 294-95 (Frankfurter, J.) (terming
the acts of violence "neither episodic nor isolated," quoting the state court's conclusion that
" 'in connection with or following a series of assaults or destruction of property, [picketing]
could not help but have the effect of intimidating the persons in front of whose premises such
picketing occurred,' " and adding that "[w]e can reject such a determination only if we can say
that it is so without warrant as to be a palpable evasion of the constitutional guarantee."
(citation omitted)).
32. See id. at 313 (Black, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 319 (Reed, J., dissenting).
34. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
35. Id. at 728.
36. 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942).
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dispute with "independent jobbers" who purchased their products, delivered
them to retailers in their own trucks, and resold them. Effectively distin-
guishing Ritter's Cafe without referring to it, Justice Jackson explained that
the jobbers' "mobility and their insulation from the public as middlemen
made it practically impossible for [the union] to make known [its] legitimate
grievances to the public whose patronage was sustaining the peddler system"
without picketing the bakers, and that the picketing was "such as to have
slight, if any, repercussions upon the interests of strangers to the issue.",3 7
The reference to the impact upon "strangers" seemed to suggest that the
bakers, unlike the owner of Ritter's Cafe, were not "neutrals" at all since the
"independent jobbers" were their former deliverymen. In a real sense the
dispute was over the bakers' own decision to stop employing union labor.38
The argument respecting the drivers' mobility, however, was more funda-
mental. Thornhill had established that picketing was an indispensable
means for bringing "the facts of a labor dispute" to the attention of the pub-
lic; the risk that it might "persuade some of those reached to refrain from
entering into advantageous relationships with the business establishment
which is the scene of the dispute" did not justify forbidding it altogether.39
Similarly, when the mobility of those with whom the picketers dispute
makes it impracticable to convey the message by picketing them directly, as
in Woh, even "repercussions upon the interests of strangers" may have to be
accepted if the message is to be effectively conveyed.' The state had a legiti-
mate interest, however, in protecting innocent persons from group boycotts
designed to force them to take sides in other people's disputes. Furthermore,
the state was entitled to effectuate this interest so long as it left the parties, as
in Ritter's Cafe, a reasonable opportunity to get their information across at
the site of the actual dispute.
Thus, there was a strong argument that, unlike the blanket prohibition on
37. Id. at 775. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Murphy, added a separate
concurring opinion. Id. at 775-77 (Douglas, J., concurring).
38. See id. at 770-71 (showing that drivers had been made "independent" to reduce social
security and unemployment-insurance costs); cf NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111, 132 (1944) (holding "independent" newsboys newspaper "employees" within National
Labor Relations Act).
39. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 104 (1940) ("The safeguarding of these means is
essential to the securing of an informed and educated public opinion .... ); cf Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (holding risk of littering did not justify total ban on distribution
of hand bills on sidewalks and streets), discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2.
40. Thus, for example, picketing the site of the new building in Ritter's Cafe might well
have been constitutionally protected, although it too might have had some tendency to "con-
script neutrals," because that was the most logical place to publicize a dispute with the build-
ing contractor. Picketing at the building site, Justice Frankfurter noted, had not been
enjoined. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. at 724.
1987]
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picketing in Thornhill, the injunction upheld in Ritter's Cafe was a reason-
able regulation of the place and manner of communicating information.4'
Moreover, the fact that the picketers chose to convey their message at the
premises of a person with whom they had no direct dispute strongly suggests
that their purpose was in large part to persuade others not to do business
with him. If the state can forbid a concerted refusal to deal under these
circumstances, it should be able to forbid speech inciting to the commission
of the offense-by picketing or otherwise.42 The decision underlined the
growing split on matters of free expression between Justices Frankfurter,
Roberts, Byrnes, and Stone on one side and Justices Black, Douglas, Mur-
phy, and Reed on the other, with Justice Jackson holding the balance of
power between them.
II. JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES-AGAIN
In the 1930's, Jehovah's Witnesses had won significant first amendment
victories, from freedom from overbroad or discretionary permit require-
ments to the right to distribute handbills and protection against abusive en-
forcement of laws against breaches of the peace.43 At the end of the Hughes
period, however, the Witnesses had been rebuffed in seeking special exemp-
tion from a generally applicable flag salute requirement and in attacking a
41. Congress soon wrote similar distinctions into § 8(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (7) (1982)). Ritter's Cafe may
indeed have been easier to defend than the limitations in Taft-Hartley, which forbade picketing
only by labor organizations and only for certain goals, since it was based upon a general anti-
trust statute that seemed neutrally to forbid all speakers to induce third parties to take sides in
other people's disputes.
42. See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 469 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., without
dissent) (upholding injunction against picketing to induce unlawful racial discrimination in
hiring); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (Black, J., writing for
a unanimous Court) (upholding injunction against picketing to induce wholesaler to join illegal
group boycott of nonunion ice peddlers: "It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204,
206 (1919) ("We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other compe-
tent person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a murder
within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free
speech."); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513, 524 (1943). It
is noteworthy that the remedy in all the picketing cases was an injunction, which the Court in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), had condemned as a prior restraint even when the
expression enjoined was constitutionally punishable. See Hughes II, supra note 2. Nobody
explained why illegal picketing should be an exception to this rule. See Teller, Picketing and
Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REV. 180, 195-200 (1942) (arguing that Ritter and Wohl substan-
tially weakened Thornhill's equation of picketing with speech).
43. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); Hughes II, supra note 2 (discussing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)).
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parade permit provision carefully limited to traffic control purposes." Con-
tinued reversals during the early days of Chief Justice Stone came to an ab-
rupt halt after Justice Rutledge replaced Justice Byrnes in 1943.
A. Fighting Words
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"4 none of the Justices had any difficulty
in concluding that a state could punish a Jehovah's Witness or anyone else
for calling a city marshal a " 'God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fas-
cist.' " It was the libertarian Justice Murphy who wrote to emphasize that
"the right of free speech [wa]s not absolute" and that "insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace"-were among "certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech" that were not protected-both for historical
reasons and because of their "slight social value" when compared with "the
social interest in order and morality.",46
While Justice Black rejected history in Bridges, Justice Murphy embraced
it in Chaplinsky. Posterity was to have difficulty with Murphy's gratuitous
assimilation of "the lewd and obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous" to the
unprotected categories, 47 as well as with the Court's contemporaneous and
wholly conclusory holding that "commercial advertising" was not protected
either.48 Regardless of history, it is always troublesome in terms of first
44. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 625 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); see also Hughes
II, supra note 2.
45. 315 U.S. 568, 569-70 (1942) (quoting the complaint in Chaplinsky).
46. Id. at 571-72 (adding that the punishment of speech in such categories had "never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem"); see also id. at 574 ("The appellations
'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace."). Justice Murphy's biographer, who
carefully documented his increasing zeal for protection of civil liberties, termed the Chaplinsky
opinion "early Murphy." See J. HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY 256 (1968).
47. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(limiting the traditional cause of action for libel); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14
(1957) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting from decision holding obscene publications
punishable).
48. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (Roberts, J.). This debatable de-
cision had been foreshadowed by equally conclusory dictum in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 165 (1939), discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2, and it derived support from repeated
arguments that the purpose of the first amendment was to permit free discussion of political
issues as an instrument of self-government. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring); A. MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELA-
TIONS TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 15-16, 24-27, 39 (1948); see also Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122
F.2d 511, 524 (2d Cir. 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting), ("Such men as Thomas Paine, John
Milton and Thomas Jefferson were not fighting for the right to peddle commercial advertis-
ing."), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Resnick, Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation, 30
1987]
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amendment policy to limit the content of speech.4 9 A neutral ban on fight-
ing words, in contrast, can be defended as a reasonable restriction of the
manner of expression, since it leaves the speaker free to convey whatever
message he likes in less inflammatory terms.5 °
B. License Taxes
Two months after Chaplinsky, however, differences of opinion boiled up
again when the Court, by a five to four vote in Jones v. Opelika," held that
the Constitution granted Jehovah's Witnesses no exemption from taxes on
the sale of religious literature. The lineup of Justices was the same as in the
picketing case of Ritter's Cafe, with two interesting exceptions-this time it
was Justice Reed who wrote to reject the constitutional claim, while Chief
Justice Stone joined the predictable Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy in
dissent. 52
Discriminatory taxes on newspapers had been struck down in Grosjean v.
American Press Co.53 in 1936, but the taxes upheld in Jones applied impar-
tially to purveyors of other goods as well.54 In Grosjean, the Court made
clear that it did not mean "to suggest that the owners of newspapers are
immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for the support of the
government." 55 A later decision would explain why: "We need not fear that
a government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome tax-
ation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its constituency.,
56
CAL. L. REV. 655, 661 (1942). But see Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976) (holding certain advertisements protected: "[S]ociety also may have
a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.").
Determining what speech was "commercial," in any event, was to prove somewhat challeng-
ing. For example, while Valentine had held that an advertisement could not be brought under
the constitutional umbrella simply by affixing to it a protest against the advertising ban itself,
316 U.S. at 55, Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (Black, J.), held that distribution of
an invitation to a religious meeting could not be prohibited simply because it also invited the
purchase of books. Not one Justice suggested that the two cases were indistinguishable.
49. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, passim (1983).
50. Id. at 242-44 (discussing the related issue of profanity); cf Hughes II, supra note 2.
51. 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
52. See id. at 600-24.
53. 297 U.S. 233 (1936), discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2.
54. Jones, 316 U.S. at 586-92.
55. 297 U.S. at 250; cf Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93
(1946) (Rutledge, J.) (holding the same for Fair Labor Standards Act); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (Black, J.) (holding the same for antitrust law); Associ-
ated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (holding press not immune from generally
applicable labor laws).
56. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
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Justice Reed thought this conclusion determinative in Jones: "The First
Amendment does not require a subsidy in the form of fiscal exemption" for
either religion or the press.
5 7
The Witnesses' setback was temporary, however, for within a year Justice
Rutledge had replaced Justice Byrnes, voted with the Jones dissenters to
grant a rehearing,5" and joined Justice Douglas' opinion in Murdock v. Penn-
59 60sylvania 9 for a new five to four majority reaching the opposite conclusion.
Echoing Stone's dissent in the earlier case, Douglas argued it was not
enough that similar taxes had been laid upon commercial enterprises oper-
ated for profit-the Constitution had placed freedom of speech, press, and
religion "in a preferred position." 61
Decisions limiting the use of injunctions and permits that could have been
employed against other activities did indeed suggest that speech and press,
although not religion, were entitled to some special constitutional privi-
leges.6 2 There were, moreover, strong arguments to support this distinction.
The virtual representation assured by forbidding discrimination may well be
sufficient to protect "discrete and insular minorities," which seems to have
been the purpose of the free exercise clause. It may nevertheless be inade-
quate to assure the integrity of the political process, which Justice Stone had
rightly suggested was one of the functions of free expression in Carolene
Products.6 3 Justice Murphy seemed to be going very far, however, in sug-
gesting in a second Jones dissent that those exercising first amendment free-
doms bore no responsibility whatever for helping to defray the common
costs of government.' Justice Douglas, in Murdock, pulled back from this
57. 316 U.S. at 599.
58. Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam).
59. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
60. See Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 313, 320 (1952) ("The tenure of Mr. Justice Rutledge marks the era par excellence of
civil liberties ... in American jurisprudence.").
61. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115; Jones, 316 U.S. at 608. Stone had also argued in Jones that
the discretionary power of city officials to revoke a permit for the sale of literature created the
same potential for discrimination that had condemned a permit requirement in Lovell v. Grif-
fin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2. Jones, 316 U.S. at 600-03.
Justice Reed reaffirmed Lovell in Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943); in Jones, he
appropriately responded that the revocation provision was not at issue. 316 U.S. at 599-600.
62. See Hughes II, supra note 2 (discussing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) and
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)). See generally Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586 (1940) (no religious exemption from flag salute rule); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1879) (no religious exemption from polygamy laws), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra
note 6, at 439-42. For an early effort to assimilate the criteria for infringements on freedom of
religion to those on freedom of expression, see Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious
Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REV. 53 (1946).
63. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
64. Except for fees "commensurate with any expenses entailed by the presence of the
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extreme position: "It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property
of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the
privilege of delivering a sermon. "65
Justice Douglas' hackneyed argument that "[tjhe power to tax the exercise
of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment" applied
equally to the income and property taxes he professed to distinguish. 66 Ad-
ditionally, there was no contention that the amounts demanded were oppres-
sive or prohibitive. 67 Nevertheless there were aspects of the privilege tax
that arguably justified Douglas' distinction.
First, the taxes in question were "fixed in amount and unrelated to the
scope of the activities of petitioners or to their realized revenues.",68 Accord-
ingly, as Chief Justice Stone had said in analogizing to state taxes on persons
engaged in interstate commerce, by its form alone "[t]he tax imposed . . .
[was] more burdensome and destructive of the activity taxed than any gross
receipts tax.",69 Payment of the tax, moreover, was made a condition of the
right to sell literature because the sanction for nonpayment was denial of the
Witnesses," Murphy argued, "no tax whatever can be levied on petitioners' activities in distrib-
uting their literature or disseminating their ideas." Jones, 316 U.S. at 620 (Murphy, J., dis-
senting) (citing Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941), for the acceptability of fees
to cover expenses caused by a parade); see Hughes II, supra note 2. But see Murdock, 319 U.S.
at 131 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("The distributors of religious literature, possibly of all informa-
tory publications, become today privileged to carry on their occupations without contributing
their share to the support of the government which provides the opportunity for the exercise of
their liberties."); id. at 135 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Murphy also suggested that the tax
had been discriminatorily applied. "[N]o attempt was . . . made to apply the ordinance to
ministers functioning in a more orthodox manner than petitioner." Jones, 316 U.S. at 617
(Murphy, J., dissenting). A showing of discrimination would of course have condemned the
tax, but the Court did not find discrimination in Murdock, and Justice Frankfurter insisted
that no claim of discrimination had been made. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 135 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
65. 319 U.S. at 112.
66. Id. at 112; see also id. at 137 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes' aphorism
in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928), that " '[t]he power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this Court sits.' "). Justice Jackson added an embarrassing dissent of
his own in which Justice Frankfurter joined, fulminating in what seemed a rather injudicious
manner against the Witnesses' aggressive methods of spreading their message. Id. at 166-82
(Jackson, J., dissenting); cf M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819)
("[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy.").
67. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 130 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("No claim is made that the effect of these taxes, either separately or cumulatively,
has been, or is likely to be, to restrict the petitioners' religious propaganda activities in any
degree. Counsel expressly disclaim any such contention.").
68. Id. at 113 (Douglas, J.).
69. Jones, 316 U.S. at 609 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (citing McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Co., 309 U.S. 33, 55-57 (1940) (dictum)); cf Berwind-White, 309 U.S. at 45 n.2. (taxes of a
kind that two or more states might impose upon the same transaction were forbidden without
regard to their amount because they placed interstate trade at a competitive disadvantage).
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right itself.70 As Justice Douglas also suggested, commerce clause prece-
dents had long insisted that the payment of a tax not unduly burdensome in
itself could not be made a condition of exercising the federal right to engage
in interstate commerce.7' While interstate commerce could be required to
pay its own way, it could not be prohibited. Finally, the requirement that
the speaker obtain a license to speak conjured up visions of the censorship
that had been at the heart of the historic opposition to limitations on free
expression. Though the requirement left the licensing authority no discre-
tion to deny a permit to anyone tendering payment of the tax, it bore more
than a little resemblance to the classic "previous restraint. ' '72 Jones and
Murdock were anything but easy cases, yet they did not hold that speech,
press, or religion must be exempted from paying their share of the cost of
governing.
C Doorbells and Flags
In Martin v. City of Struthers,73 decided the same day as Murdock and by
the same vote, the Jehovah's Witnesses won another great victory as Justice
Black wrote to strike down an ordinance forbidding door-to-door distribu-
tion of handbills, circulars, and other forms of advertisements. 74 Conceding
that "the peace, good order, and comfort of the community may impera-
tively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution" and
that the homeowner's privacy was a legitimate state concern, 75 Black con-
vincingly argued that the means selected to assuage it went too far. Black
emphasized that "door to door distribution of circulars [was] essential to the
poorly financed causes of little people" and that the city had substituted its
judgment for that of the householders, some of whom might wish to receive
the message. 76 The interest in privacy, he concluded, could be adequately
70. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106, 114 ("It is a flat license tax levied and collected as a
condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First
Amendment.").
71. See id. at 113; cf, e.g., Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 698 (1895)
(Fuller, C.J.) (dictum).
72. See, Murdock, 319 U.S. at 114 ("[I]t restrains in advance those constitutional liberties
of press and religion .... "); cf Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding permit
requirement limited to traffic concerns); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking
down permit requirement for distribution of literature as previous restraint); Hughes II, supra
note 2.
73. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
74. Id. at 142; see also id. at 152 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 154 (Reed, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 157, 166, 181-82 (Jackson, J., dissenting). That the ordinance discriminated against
speakers and in favor of salesmen made it immediately suspect, but the Court chose a broader
ground of decision.
75. Id. at 143.
76. Id. at 146.
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protected by making it an offense "to ring the bell of a householder who has
appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed. ' 77 Like the
handbilling and picketing decisions, Martin seemed to strike an admirable
balance between competing interests.78
One of the oddest aspects of the license-tax litigation was a separate dis-
sent by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy in Jones signaling their repen-
tance for having voted in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 79 over Stone's
lone dissent, to sustain the requirement that Jehovah's Witnesses salute the
flag.8 ° Justices Hughes and McReynolds, who also had joined the majority
in Gobitis, had since given way to Justices Jackson and Rutledge, both of
whom joined in a six-to-three opinion by the former in the famous case of
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,"' where the Court re-
versed itself on this issue too. 2
Justice Stone's earlier dissent had suggested that those with religious ob-
jections were entitled to a special exemption from what he seemed to assume
was an otherwise valid requirement, and so had the brief statement of the
three converts in Jones. 8 3 Jackson's magnificent "opinion of the Court" in
Barnette, however, took a broader tack by proclaiming that no one could be
compelled to salute the flag. Freedom of speech included the freedom not to
speak; no state interest in inculcating patriotism justified such an infringe-
ment upon individual autonomy.8 4
77. Id. at 148.
78. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text (discussing the picketing cases); cf
Hughes II, supra note 2 (discussing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
79. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
80. Id., discussed in Hughes II, supra note 2; id. at 601-07 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); Jones
v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, Douglas, & Murphy, JJ., dissenting) (describ-
ing both cases as sanctioning "device[s] which .. .suppress[ ] or tend[ ] to suppress the free
exercise of a religion practiced by a minority group"). Gobitis was met with virtually unani-
mous scholarly criticism. See Heller, A Turning Point for Religious Liberty, 29 VA. L. REV.
440, 450-53 (1943) (collecting the authorities).
81. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940)).
82. Id. at 642; see also id. at 642-43 (Roberts & Reed, JJ., dissenting); id. at 646-71
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. See supra note 80.
84. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35 ("Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's posses-
sion of particular religious views .... It is not necessary to inquire whether non-conformist
beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first find power to make the salute a legal
duty."); id. at 633 n.13 (citing William Tell's legendary refusal to salute a bailiff's hat and
William Penn's refusal to uncover his head in deference to civil authority); id. at 634 ("To
sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the
individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to
utter what is not in his mind."); id. at 641 ("Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel
coherence is the lesson or every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as
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In announcing this eminently appropriate assessment of the competing in-
terests, Justice Jackson went out of his way to endorse Justice Stone's sug-
gestion in Carolene Products that measures affecting first amendment
freedoms were subject to much stricter scrutiny than those in which the due
process clause was "applied for its own sake." 5 Jackson stated:
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is
much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is in-
volved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disap-
pears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its
standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public
utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned,
power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have
a "rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of
press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such
slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to pre-
vent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may
lawfully protect.8 6
Justice Frankfurter's famous dissent left no doubt that he rejected this
distinction in toto:
The admonition that judicial self-restraint alone limits arbitrary ex-
ercise of our authority is relevant every time we are asked to nullify
legislation. The Constitution does not give us greater veto power
a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles
as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian ene-
mies .... To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary...
is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds."). Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy wrote separate opinions invoking religious freedom, but they did
not disown Jackson's "opinion of the Court." See id. at 643 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concur-
ring) ("We are substantially in agreement with the opinion [of Jackson] just read .... ); id. at
644 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("I agree with the opinion of the Court and join in it."); see also
id. at 632-33 (Jackson, J.) (reaffirming that freedom of expression embraced communicative
actions as well as words: "Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating
ideas."); Hughes II, supra note 2 (discussing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)).
The implication of the two flag salute cases that freedom of religion did not require exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws was reinforced the following term when the Court upheld
application of child labor laws to the proselytizing activities of Jehovah's Witnesses in Prince
v. Massachusets, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944) (Rutledge, J.) (reaffirming that first amendment
freedoms made applicable to the states by due process enjoyed a "preferred position in our
basic scheme"). Murphy filed the expected dissent. Id. at 171-76 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, petulantly concluded that the
distinguishable decision in Murdock, from which they had dissented, required them to vote to
reverse the judgment sustaining the application of the child-labor law although they believed it
correct. Id. at 176-78 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
85. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639.
86. Id. at 639.
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when dealing with one phase of 'liberty' than with another ....
Our power does not vary according to the particular provision of
the Bill of Rights which is invoked .... [W]henever legislation is
sought to be nullified on any ground, . . . responsibility for legisla-
tion lies with legislatures, answerable as they are directly to the
people, and this Court's only and very narrow function is to deter-
mine whether within the broad grant of authority vested in legisla-
tures they have exercised a judgment for which reasonable
justification can be offered.8 7
In so saying, Justice Frankfurter laid bare the fundamental cause of the
unbridgeable abyss that separated New Deal Justices who had all agreed in
burying economic due process. Justices Stone, Black, and Jackson were no
less adamant than Frankfurter that the catastrophe of Lochner v. New
York 88 must not be repeated, but they disagreed sharply as to the means of
preventing it. The majority of the Justices had a narrow conception of sub-
stantive due process; Justice Frankfurter had a narrow conception of judicial
review.
The majority had yet to give a satisfactory answer to Justice Frankfurter's
question of how measures impinging on different "liberties" could be given
different levels of scrutiny in applying the due process clause to evaluate
state action.8 9 His reference to the Bill of Rights and his further insistence
that the question was the same as if an act of Congress had been involved,9 °
however, made clear that his disagreement with the majority was broader.
He seemed to have concluded that the only way to protect against further
abuses like Lochner was to minimize judicial authority to enforce any consti-
tutional provisions.9
87. Id. at 648-49 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
88. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
89. See Stone I, supra note 1, at 13-15.
90. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 666 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The uncontrollable power wielded by this Court brings it very close to the most
sensitive areas of public affairs. As appeal from legislation to adjudication becomes
more frequent, and its consequences more far-reaching, judicial self-restraint be-
comes more and not less important, lest we unwarrantably enter social and political
domains wholly outside our concern.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For his Spartan view of the judicial function, Justice Frank-
furter invoked Justice Holmes, whose pungent dissent in Lochner had served more than any-
thing else to call attention to the problem. See id. at 649 (quoting Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v.
May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75, discussed in Fuller I, supra note 6, at
378-82. Significantly, however, despite suggestions in his earlier opinions, Holmes himself had
abandoned the position for which Frankfurter cited him. See White, supra note 6, at 1145-52.
Several of his most illustrious opinions attest that his standards for reviewing claims both of
free expression and of uncompensated takings were far stricter than those he applied in ordi-
nary substantive due process cases. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925)
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Justice Jackson recognized in Barnette that it was not necessary to stop
enforcing limitations that were in the Constitution in order to avoid impos-
ing others that were not. In his sincere concern to keep judges from exceed-
ing their constitutional authority, Justice Frankfurter came perilously close
to repudiating that authority itself.92
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The basic dispute over the intrusiveness of judicial review that character-
ized the Stone Court's encounters with the "specific prohibitions" of the first
amendment emerged in other fields as well. In Powell v. Alabama,93 for ex-
ample, where "ignorant" defendants had been sentenced to death for rape,
the Court broke new ground in a noble 1932 opinion by Justice Sutherland
by holding that the due process clause required a state to provide lawyers to
defendants unable to employ their own: "[t]he right to be heard would be, in
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel." 94 Ten years later, in Betts v. Brady, 95 a divided Court nevertheless
upheld a state robbery conviction although the defendant's request for an
assigned attorney had been denied.
In concluding in Betts that the right to assigned counsel in such cases was
not "fundamental," Justice Roberts relied largely on the absence of such a
right in the colonies and in many state constitutions.96 If practice was to be
a guide, however, Justice Black furnished food for thought in noting that
thirty-five states provided for appointing counsel in noncapital cases by
either constitution, statute, or judicial custom. 97 More important, neither
history nor practice had been the basis of Powell, and it was equally true in
noncapital cases that a trial without counsel was no trial at all.98
(Holmes, J., dissenting), discussed in Taft, supra note 20, at 82-88; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), discussed in Taft, supra note 20, at 92-99; Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), discussed in White, supra note 6,
at 1152-55. Following Holmes' example in accordance with Carolene Products' suggestion
respecting "specific prohibition[s]" of the Constitution, the Court was far from deferential in
upholding (over dissents by Justices Black and Burton) a taking claim based on the low flight
of airplanes over the plaintiff's land in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (Douglas,
J.).
92. See Kalven, Book Review, 37 IND. L.J. 572, 577 (1962) (reviewing W. MENDELSON,
JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1961)) ("[W]hy should any
one have preferred the setting up of this anemic check to the simplicity of not having judicial
review at all?").
93. 287 U.S. 45, 173 (1932).
94. Id. at 69; Hughes II, supra note 2.
95. 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (Roberts, J.).
96. Id. at 465-72.
97. See id. at 477 & n.2 (Black, J., dissenting).
98. In reliance on Powell, the Court had declared that the sixth amendment entitled every
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The Court displayed neither judicial restraint nor concern for state auton-
omy in Powell or in its other criminal procedure decisions of the early
1930's.99 In 1937, however, in Palko v. Connecticut, 'a Justice Cardozo em-
ployed language reminiscent of the hands-off attitude that characterized eco-
nomic cases of the later Hughes period in arguing that right-minded men
could reasonably believe that permitting the state to appeal an acquittal was
not "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."' 1 In echoing this language,
Betts showed how miserly such an attitude could be by largely abandoning a
right that even the Justices of the early 1930's had rightly deemed funda-
mental. In order to find that convicting a defendant with no lawyer to de-
fend him was not "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of
fairness and right"'0 2 the Justices needed, as Justice Black protested, a very
thick skin. 1o3
Only Justices Douglas and Murphy joined Justice Black in his dissent in
Betts. Justice Rutledge had not yet been appointed. It was interesting that
Chief Justice Stone voted with the majority after his suggestion in Carolene
Products of more aggressive review in cases involving "specific prohibition[s]
... such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."'" Apparently,
while freedom of speech was made "specific[ally]" applicable to the states
because it was so fundamental, the right to assigned counsel was not because
it was fundamental only in certain cases.'0 5
In rejecting this subtle distinction, Justice Black, who had joined the
Palko majority, first suggested the sweeping doctrine for which his dissent in
Adamson v. California ' 6 would soon make him famous. Legislative history
showed, Black argued in Betts, that the purpose of the fourteenth amend-
impoverished federal criminal defendant to assigned counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462-63, 467 (1938).
99. For a discussion of the decisions, see Hughes II, supra note 2.
100. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
101. Id. at 323.
102. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
103. Id. at 475-76 (Black, J., dissenting).
104. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Other criminal procedure decisions of the Stone
period are summarized in Boskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Proce-
dure, 13 U. CH. L. REv. 266 (1946).
105. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 461-62. The Court stated:
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate, as such,
the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment, although a denial by a State
of rights or privileges specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight
amendments may ... operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of
law ....
Id.
106. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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ment was "to make secure against invasion by the states the fundamental
liberties and safeguards set out in the Bill of Rights," including the right to
counsel:' °7 "I believe that the fourteenth amendment made the sixth
amendment applicable to the states.' ' 8 This position had been rejected
before, and there were troublesome arguments against it.'° 9 However, if the
Senate spokesman for the amendment was correct in saying that it made all
the protections of the Bill of Rights "privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States" binding the states as well,"' then it was not inconsistent
after all to enforce these rights aggressively against the states while essen-
tially abandoning substantive due process; for in this view, their applicability
to the states did not depend on that discredited doctrine at all.
IV. INSULAR MINORITIES AND POLITICAL PROCESSES
A. Blacks
Carolene Products hinted at strict enforcement not only of "specific" con-
stitutional prohibitions-which should have included the equal protection
clause and the fifteenth amendment's ban on racial denial of the vote-but
also of provisions protecting "those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or the rights of
"discrete and insular minorities." 1 ' These two categories coalesced in
Smith v. Allwright,"2 a case involving a white primary, where the Court
delivered one of its greatest blows both for the equality of blacks and for the
integrity of our political system.
Although the Court struck down the exclusion of blacks from primary
elections whenever it could find the state responsible, it had felt stymied in
Grovey v. Townsend, 13 where the discriminatory decision had been made by
a party convention."14 Nine years after Grovey, in Smith, the Court changed
its mind. On second thought, the discrimination could be pinned on the
state. I' 5
107. 316 U.S. at 474 & n.I (Black, J., dissenting); cf Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-123 (Black,
J., dissenting).
108. Betts, 316 U.S. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting).
109. See D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 342-51, 363-68 (discussing the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
110. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-66 (1866) (remarks of Senator Howard).
111. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
112. 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).
113. 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
114. See Hughes II, supra note 2 (discussing Grovey, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).
115. Only Justice Roberts, author of Grovey and one of the two remaining Justices who had
then been on the Court, dissented. Smith, 321 U.S. at 666-70 (Roberts, J., dissenting). There
was irony in his protest against the Court's willingness to overrule precedents, since Roberts
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Justice Reed's opinion relied in substantial part on state regulation of the
party, which the Grovey Court had found insufficient. Justice Reed noted
that state law provided for the election of party officers and delegates to the
party convention and that state statutes set the fees to be paid by candidates
to defray costs of the primary elections. Additionally, state courts had juris-
diction "to compel party officers to perform their statutory duties."' 16 Thus,
according to Reed, "[p]rimary elections [were] conducted by the party under
state statutory authority" and "[t]he party [took] its character as a state
agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes."' 117
All of this was pretty flimsy, and none of it seemed to distinguish political
parties from other associations or individuals whose activities were regulated
by state law. Such arguments, if taken at face value, could have largely ob-
literated the constitutional distinction between public and private action." 8
Not only was the Court, in conformity with Stone's dictum, showing pre-
cious little restraint in protecting minorities and the political process,' 9 it
also seemed to be stretching the Constitution in order to do so.
After Stone's death, the Justices had to find a new rationale for their deci-
sion in Terry v. Adams 2' that the "Jaybird Democratic Association's" lily-
white preprimary must be struck down. As Justice Minton protested in a
lone dissent, the preprimary was not regulated by the state at all.' 2' Justice
Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton, seemed to argue that the state
himself is best known for voting to overrule decisions invalidating minimum wage laws in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), discussed in Hughes I, supra note 3, at 542-43.
The majority professed to find support for its change of mind in United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941) (Stone, J.), which had repudiated the parsimonious conclusion in Newberry v.
United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), that Congress' article I authority over federal "elections"
did not include primaries. See White, supra note 6, at 1128 n.88. Classic enabled the Court in
Smith to base its conclusion on the more obviously relevant fifteenth amendment rather than
the equal protection clause, which was the basis of two earlier cases striking down state exclu-
sion of blacks from primaries. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927). It was of no direct relevance to the problem that had precluded relief in
Grovey, however, for Classic involved both actions of state officials and a provision that did not
require state action. The fifteenth amendment, like the fourteenth, applies to the "State[s]"
and also, unlike the latter, to the United States. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV with U.S.
CONST. amend. XV.
116. Smith, 321 U.S. at 663.
117. Id.
118. See D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 398-402 (discussing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883)).
119. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 662 ("Despite Texas' decision that the exclusion is produced by
private or party action, . . federal courts must for themselves appraise the facts leading to that
conclusion."); see also Hughes II, supra note 2 (discussing Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935)).
120. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
121. Id. at 485 (Minton, J., dissenting).
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was responsible for private discrimination because it had not prohibited it.
Black's thesis would wholly eliminate the requirement of state action. 122
Justice Frankfurter, in arguing that state officers had "participated in" the
discriminatory scheme "by voting in the Jaybird primary," ignored the dis-
tinction between public and private acts of state officials on which he himself
had most zealously insisted in other cases. 123 Justice Clark, writing for the
remaining four members of the Court, seemed to put his finger on a more
promising argument:
[T]he Jaybird Democratic Association is the decisive power in the
county's recognized electoral process. . . . [W]hen a state struc-
tures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon a polit-
ical organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that
organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes
of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into
play. 124
This argument takes on meaning from Justice Black's opinion in Marsh v.
Alabama, '25 one of the Court's last pronouncements before Stone's death in
1946. That case followed Lovell v. City of Griffin 126 and other precedents in
forbidding a municipality to bar the sidewalk distribution of literature or to
condition it on a permit that could be denied at will.' 2 7 There was just one
difference between Marsh and the earlier cases: the municipality in Marsh
was a company town.
Chickasaw, Alabama, where the case arose, was owned and governed by
122. Id. at 469 (opinion of Black, J.) ("For a state to permit such a duplication of its
election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the
Fifteenth Amendment."); see also id. at 485 (Minton, J., dissenting) ("As I understand Mr.
Justice Black's opinion, he would have this Court redress the wrong even if it was individual
action alone.").
123. See id. at 473-77 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); id. at 485 (Minton, J., dissenting) (ad-
ding that the record contained no evidence that officials had participated in the primary); cf
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202-59 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (taking a similar
view of the "under color of" state law requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)); Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 17 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("I am unable to grasp the princi-
ple on which the State can here be said to deny the plaintiff the equal protection of the laws of
the State when the foundation of his claim is that the Board had disobeyed the authentic
command of the State.").
124. Terry, 345 U.S. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring); cf id. at 469 (opinion of Black, J.)
("The only election that has counted in this Texas county for more than fifty years has been
that held by the Jaybirds from which Negroes were excluded .... The Jaybird primary has
become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective process that determines
who shall rule and govern in the county.").
125. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
126. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
127. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 504 (citing Lovell, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)); see also Hughes II, supra
note 2.
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the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.' 2 8 Justice Reed, joined by Chief Justice
Stone and Justice Burton, objected that Marsh was "the first case to extend
by law the privilege of religious exercises ... to private places without the
assent of the owner."' 2 9 Justice Black demurred, arguing that the corpora-
tion's right to control the residents of Chickasaw was not "coextensive with
the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests."' 130 "[A]
company-owned town," as Frankfurter succinctly stated in a concurring
opinion, "is a town."'' Except for the question of title, Black added, there
was "nothing to distinguish Chickasaw from any other town," '32 and the
public interest in open channels of communication was the same. 133
Those who govern, in other words, are the "state" within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment. The purposes of the amendment are applicable
to all who perform the functions of government, whether they are elected,
appointed, or otherwise private persons. That seems to be what Justice
Clark was suggesting when he noted in Terry that the Jaybird organization
had "take[n] on those attributes of government which draw the Constitu-
tion's safeguards into play."' 34 Justice Reed, despite his Marsh dissent and
his stress on ephemeral traces of state regulation, intimated the same thing in
Smith when he commented that "recognition of the place of the primary in
the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power
to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function
that may make the party's action the action of the State."'
' 35
Like governing itself, the election of those who govern is such a central
state function that whoever controls it is the "state" within the meaning of
constitutional limitations. That test, like most, would present nasty line-
drawing problems. Yet it seemed much more faithful to the purposes of the
framers than any of the more sweeping theories that had been offered in an
128. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502-03; id. at 513 (Reed, J., dissenting) (Company towns "may be
essential to furnish proper and convenient living conditions for employees on isolated opera-
tions in lumbering, mining, production of high explosives and large-scale farming."). "In the
bituminous coal industry alone," Justice Black noted, "approximately one-half of the miners in
the United States lived in company-owned houses in the period from 1922-23." Id. at 508 n.5.
129. Id. at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 506.
131. Id. at 510 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 503.
133. Id. at 507.
134. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring).
135. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944); see also id. at 664 ("When primaries
become a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and national .... the same tests to
determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied to the primary as
are applied to the general election."). For an approving view, see Cushman, The Texas "White
Primary" Case-Smith v. Allwright, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 66 (1944).
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effort to make the fifteenth amendment more than an empty formality.
Moreover, it certainly suggested very little in the way of judicial restraint.
B. Other Outsiders
Because state regulations affecting interstate commerce often imposed
burdens "principally upon those without the state," Justice Stone noted in
South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers '36 in 1938, "legis-
lative action [in such cases] is not likely to be subjected to those political
restraints which are normally exerted on legislation." In light of these obser-
vations, it was understandable that Stone cited Barnwell in Carolene Prod-
ucts along with cases of racial and religious discrimination as examples of
the arguable need for "more searching judicial inquiry" in cases involving
"discrete and insular minorities."'' 37
Since geographical outsiders have no vote, they are in special need of con-
stitutional protection. An efficient way to provide this protection, with rela-
tively modest displacement of the normal political process, is to tie the fate
of those who are not represented to that of those who are by forbidding
discrimination. '38 The framers utilized this approach in article IV by requir-
ing one state to afford citizens of another all the privileges and immunities of
its own citizens. The same method was employed in the fourteenth, fif-
teenth, and nineteenth amendments to protect the interests of blacks and,
later, of women. As Justice Stone explained in Barnwell, this approach also
helps to explain the Court's longstanding insistence that interstate commerce
may not be subjected to discriminatory burdens. 139
136. 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938).
137. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Justice Stone also
cited in this connection M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819), where
Justice Marshall had made a similar argument in holding the Bank of the United States im-
mune from state taxation. See D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 165-68.
138. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 81-87 (1980).
139. See 303 U.S. at 185 (dictum) ("The commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits dis-
crimination against interstate commerce, whatever its form or method .... ); see also, e.g.,
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (striking down state tax applicable only to out of state
goods), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 404-05. Because local residents with normal
political power may also engage in interstate transactions, the analogy to racial minorities is
not perfect. Yet the presence of outside interests suggests that the concerns of interstate com-
merce may be underrepresented in the counsels of any one state.
Marshall's reasoning in the analogous field of intergovernmental immunity in M'Culloch, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428, seemed to go further than this argument required. A ban limited to
discriminatory taxes, such as that imposed in M'Culloch itself, would have given the national
bank political protection by tying its fate to that of local institutions. Under Chief Justice
Stone, recognizing that the United States could protect itself by legislation and that the states
were adequately represented in Congress, the Court continued to chip away at intergovern-
mental immunities. See, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (Black, J.) (federal price
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Edwards v. California, 140 abandoning ancient dicta in denying the right of
a state to exclude paupers in the most important opinion of the short-ten-
ured Justice Byrnes, properly reflected these concerns with the observation
that "the indigent non-residents who are the real victims of this statute are
deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the California
legislature in order to obtain a change in policy."" '' Justices Douglas,
Black, and Murphy, evidently gearing up for an assault on the Court's com-
merce clause jurisprudence, argued instead that the state's action abridged
the mysterious right to travel originally recognized in Crandall v. Nevada, 142
which the Slaughter-House Cases'43 described as a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship protected by the fourteenth amendment; Justice Jackson
basically agreed.' Although Justice Douglas mentioned it in passing, none
of the Justices relied on the most obvious constitutional basis for the deci-
sion: clear discrimination against citizens of other states in violation of the
regulation may apply to state timber sales), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 33 n.187;
Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943) (Stone, C.J.) (upholding
application of state minimum price regulations to sale of milk to United States); Alabama v.
King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) (Stone, C.J.) (upholding state tax on government contrac-
tor's purchase of building materials despite contract clause passing on all costs to United
States). Neither Stone nor any other Justice voted, however, to abandon such immunities
entirely or to limit that of the United States strictly to discriminatory measures. See, e.g.,
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) (Jackson, J.) (striking down nondis-
criminatory tax on government property). The immunity decisions of the period are discussed
in Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1945)
and Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1945).
140. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
141. Id. at 174. Contra, e.g., New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142-43 (1837)
(upholding requirement that ship captains furnish authorities with passenger lists with the
observation that states had right to protect themselves against "the moral pestilence of pau-
pers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts"). The question of state authority to exclude paupers
had been reserved in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 275 (1876), where a bond
requirement had been struck down as a means of coercing payment of a forbidden tax.
142. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 355-57.
143. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 342-50.
144. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177-81 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 181-86 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Justice Jackson, while conceding that Justice Byrnes' commerce clause ground
was "permissible ... under applicable authorities," also emphasized the Crandall argument,
reopening a controversy long considered settled, by suggesting that "the migrations of a
human being ... do not fit easily into my notions as to what is commerce." Id. at 181-82; cf
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449
(1841); D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 168-69 & n.78, 222-30 (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)). Byrnes' first draft had reportedly based the decision on the privi-
leges or immunities clause, but Stone talked him out of it by reminding him of the mischief
that Old Guard Justices had attempted under that provision. See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE
STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 578-80 (1956); Hughes I, supra note 3, at 539-40 (discussing
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935)).
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privileges and immunities clause of article IV. 145
In Barnwell, Justice Stone had come close to saying that the states could
regulate commerce so long as they did not discriminate against it. 146 Justice
Douglas echoed this position in his dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Ari-
zona, 147 where the majority struck down a nondiscriminatory provision lim-
iting the length of trains. Justice Black, in a separate dissent in Southern
Pacific, seemed to question the entire notion that the commerce clause lim-
ited state power, suggesting that the Court should be "at least" as deferential
to state legislatures in this field as it was in substantive due process cases.' 4 8
The Chief Justice, however, took the occasion to entrench for the majority
his original position that the validity of nondiscriminatory state regulations
affecting commerce turned on "accommodation of the competing demands
of the state and national interests involved."' 49
The dubious safety advantages of the train length law sufficiently distin-
guish Southern Pacific from Barnwell, which had upheld an obviously rea-
sonable limitation of the width of trucks.' 5 ° The tone of the two opinions,
145. "[T]here are expressions in the cases that this right of free movement of persons is an
incident of state citizenship protected against discriminatory state action by Art. IV, § 2 of the
Constitution." Edwards, 314 U.S. at 180 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The
Court consistently applied this provision according to its purpose of preventing one state from
discriminating against citizens of another. See D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 348 & n. 137. In
addition, the Articles of Confederation, from which the clause was taken, had expressly in-
cluded the right of "free ingress and regress to and from any other State"-not qualified to
except "paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice," as was the basic provision itself at the
time. Articles of Confederation, art. 4. It seems most unlikely that in omitting the explana-
tory clause respecting the right of entry, the framers of the present Constitution, which gener-
ally increased the restrictions on state authority, meant to empower one state to deny another's
citizens the most fundamental privilege of all.
146. Stone stated:
In each of these cases regulation involves a burden on interstate commerce. But so
long as the state action does not discriminate, the burden is one which the Constitu-
tion permits because it is an inseparable incident of the exercise of a legislative au-
thority, which, under the Constitution, has been left to the states.
Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 189.
147. 325 U.S. 761, 795-96 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("My view has been that the
courts should intervene only where the state legislation discriminated against interstate com-
merce or was out of harmony with laws which Congress had enacted.").
148. Id. at 792 (Black, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 769; see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943) (Stone, C.J.) (applying
same test to uphold state restrictions on marketing of raisins); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273
U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
150. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 781-82 (The state's "regulation of train lengths, ad-
mittedly obstructive to interstate train operation, . . . passes beyond what is plainly essential
for safety since it does not appear that it will lessen rather than increase the danger of acci-
dent."); Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 196 (noting that the use of 96-inch trucks on roads with 96-inch
lanes "tends to force other traffic off the concrete surface"); see also id. at 191-96 (upholding a
gross-weight limitation designed to prevent road damage over the objection that limitations on
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however, was significantly different. While Barnwell had intimated that even
severe burdens on commerce were permissible in the absence of discrimina-
tion, Southern Pacific declared that the states had wide scope for regulation
of matters of local concern "provided it [did] not materially restrict the free
flow of commerce across state lines."' 5 1 The contrast between the deferen-
tial tone of Barnwell and the unabashed activism of Southern Pacific suggests
that Stone's thinking about the commerce clause had undergone some evolu-
tion in the intervening years.
In aggressively applying a balancing test for determining the reasonable-
ness of laws that imposed neither discriminatory nor cumulative burdens on
interstate trade, Chief Justice Stone seemed to go beyond Barnwell's expla-
nation that relatively strict scrutiny was necessary to protect politically im-
potent outsiders from competitive disadvantage. In so doing, however, he
merely made explicit what the Court had basically been doing for nearly a
century.' 52 By stressing the distinct national interest in unimpeded inter-
state transportation, moreover, he seemed to assimilate the implicit limita-
tion of the commerce clause on state power to those "specific prohibitions"
which, like those of the Bill of Rights, were also candidates for less re-
strained judicial enforcement under Carolene Products. In short, like Justice
Jackson in Barnette and Justice Black in Betts, the Chief Justice seemed to
make clear in Southern Pacific that his objection to the economic activism of
the days before 1937 was to substantive due process, not to aggressive judi-
cial review.
C. Interstate Relations
Like the privileges and immunities clause of the same article, the full faith
and credit clause of article IV was designed to protect unrepresented out of
state interests in the name of interstate harmony-in this case the legitimate
interests of other states in recognition of their governmental acts. In light of
his heightened concern for the politically powerless in Carolene Products, it
seems surprising that Stone's signal contribution to this field was to replace
the traditional strict scrutiny of state choice of law decisions with a deferen-
tial analysis that permitted any interested state to resolve conflicts in its own
favor. 15
3
weight per axle would have sufficed). Chief Justice Stone's explicit basis for distinguishing the
two cases-the state's ownership of its highways-seemed less compelling. Southern Pacific,
325 U.S. at 783; cf Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (striking down highway
regulation that exposed interstate truckers to contradictory requirements in different states).
151. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 770; Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 189.
152. See Fuller I, supra note 6, at 366-69.
153. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (Stone,
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Unlike the equally deferential commerce clause views he had expressed in
Barnwell, this interest analysis continued to determine interstate choice of
law decisions after Stone's elevation to Chief Justice. 54 Once the rights of
the parties had been determined by litigation, however, Stone was faithful to
his own aggressive prior position that the policy of finality embodied in the
full faith clause required even an interested state to respect another state's
judgment. 155
J.); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (Stone, J.)
(allowing either state of accident or of contract to apply its own workers' compensation law);
Hughes I, supra note 3, at 548-50. It was understandable that Stone would reject the Procrus-
tean notion that only the state where an event occurred had any legitimate concern in its
regulation, but his theory of unrepresented interests might have led him to attempt to deter-
mine which state's interest was the greater. Cf Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945). But see Freund, Chief Justice Stone
and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REV. 1210, 1235 (1946) ("[P]roblems of choice of law
have not lent themselves to satisfactory solution as constitutional questions, and ... in their
nature they cannot be expected to.").
154. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 158, 160 (1945) (Douglas,
J.) (state may determine amount of reserve out-of-state insurer must maintain to satisfy claims
by insured residents); Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1941)
(Stone, C.J.) (state may apply own law to determine whether resident has become member of
out of state corporation and thus liable for share of its debts); see also Freund, supra note 153,
at 1232. Freund, noting the "notable latitude" left the states by the Pink decision, stated, "If
choice of law in commercial transactions is to be subjected to some extent to the unifying force
of the full faith and credit clause, there could scarcely be a more appropriate matter for such
treatment than the relation of a policyholder to his company .... " Id.
155. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) (one state's workers' compen-
sation award bars second claim for same injury in second state). Chief Justice Stone distin-
guished between statutes and judgments and stressed "the clear purpose of the full faith and
credit clause to establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common
law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties
in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered." Id. at 436-39; see Freund,
supra note 153, at 1225-30; see also Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935)
(Stone, J.) (requiring state to respect sister-state judgment for taxes); Yarborough v. Yarbor-
ough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (forbidding state to grant child support beyond that provided by
sister-state decree); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (requiring state to respect judg-
ment on gambling contract contrary to its public policy), discussed in Fuller II, supra note 18,
at 883-86; Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330 (1944) (arguing that workers' compensation should be
treated as an exceptional case). Stone had let sympathy draw him from this path in Yarbor-
ough, 290 U.S. at 213-27 (Stone, J., dissenting), but since then he had been the Court's leading
spokesman for a strict interstate res judicata policy.
The award given binding effect in Magnolia was that of an administrative agency rather than
of a court, but, as Stone said, the policy of the clause was unaffected by the label: Whether the
proceeding was a "judicial" one or its award a "record," the clause required both to be equally
respected. 320 U.S. at 443. Justice Black, writing for the four dissenters, made the more
serious objection that the first state's tribunal had had no jurisdiction to decide claims under
any other state's law: "The decision of this Court today, therefore, is tantamount to holding
that Texas intended to extinguish a claim against the employer in a proceeding in which ...
liability under Louisiana law was not allowed to be raised." Id. at 453. Jurisdiction to decide
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The critical assumption on which this clause subordinates the interest of
one state to another state's interest in finality, however, is that the litigant
have a reasonable opportunity to present his case in the forum whose judg-
ment is sought to be enforced.' 56 This assumption fails when a judgment is
pleaded against one who was not a party to the initial litigation and when
the parties have every incentive to frustrate the nonparty's legitimate inter-
est. Thus it was entirely appropriate for the Court in Williams v. North
Carolina "' to hold that a foreign divorce decree did not preclude a state
from prosecuting for bigamy two of its residents who had remarried after
traveling to another state for the sole purpose of evading the strict divorce
limitations of their home state.
The Court had shown less concern for the interest of the stay-at-home
spouse whose partner had fled to Nevada by holding, in an earlier chapter of
the same litigation, that a divorce was valid though the defendant never had
any contact with the divorcing state.' Thus, as Justice Jackson succinctly
stated in his dissent, the Court held that "settled family relationships may be
destroyed by a procedure that we would not recognize if the suit were one to
collect on a grocery bill.""' Unless one concludes that the absent spouse
was not substantially harmed because the marriages in question existed in
name only, 160 this decision seems hardly reconcilable with the modern stan-
dard of "minimum contacts, . . . 'fair play and substantial justice' " that
had always been a condition of full faith and credit. See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 165 (1851). Unless filing a claim under one state's law fairly can be held an election,
there are due process difficulties in allowing a tribunal to destroy rights it has no jurisdiction to
enforce. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (Stone, J.) (holding due process forbade
enforcing judgment against nonparty).
A few years after Magnolia, in Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 627-28 (1947)
(Murphy, J.), a unanimous Court sensibly permitted a second state to give further compensa-
tion after concluding that the first tribunal had intended to preclude further relief only under
its own law. For the subsequent fate of these decisions, see Thomas v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980), in which six Justices voted to repudiate McCartin and four voted to
overrule Magnolia as well.
156. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40-45; Fuller II, supra note 18, at 883-97.
157. 325 U.S. 226 (Frankfurter, J.), reh'g denied, 325 U.S. 898 (1945); see also Lorenzen,
Extraterritorial Divorce-Williams v. North Carolina II, 54 YALE L.J. 799, 801-02 (1945)
("[A] divorce decree in such circumstances appears more like an interference by Nevada in the
marital relations of North Carolinians ....").
158. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Douglas, J.) (overruling Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906)); see Fuller II, supra note 18, at 894-97.
159. Williams, 317 U.S. at 316 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
160. See Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 26, 29 (1966).
The author based this suggestion on Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-48 (1948), and May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953), which had reduced the impact of an ex parte divorce by
holding it could not cut off rights to alimony or child custody. But see Simons v. Miami Beach
First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965) (holding ex parte divorce extinguishes right to dower).
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Chief Justice Stone would soon enunciate to determine whether a state's ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction was consistent with due process in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington. 161
In International Shoe, decided only a few months before his death, Chief
Justice Stone did for the law of personal jurisdiction what he had done ever
since his appointment for full faith and credit, intergovernmental immunity,
extraterritorial taxation, and state laws affecting interstate commerce. 162 He
brought order out of chaos, brought out of the closet the functional consider-
ations that had often underlain earlier decisions, and laid down sensible cri-
teria that have governed ever since.1 63
D. Representation
The famous 1946 decision in Colegrove v. Green " involved a suit by Illi-
nois citizens attacking the apportionment of congressional seats among vari-
ous districts within the state. One of the complainants lived in a district
containing more than 900,000 people; other districts contained as few as
112,000.165 The complainant's vote, as Justice Black observed in his dissent,
was "only one-ninth as effective ... as the votes of other citizens."'1
66
Joined as usual by Justices Douglas and Murphy, Justice Black argued
that "[s]uch discriminatory legislation . . . [was] exactly the kind that the
equal protection clause was intended to prohibit."' 67 As an original matter
this conclusion seems questionable, since the framers' focus was on racial
discrimination and they had expressly disclaimed any intention of affecting
the right to vote.168 By 1946 it was a little late to raise either objection.' 69
Whether there might be justifications for the discrepancy, however, re-
161. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
162. See Hughes I, supra note 3, passim.
163. See Cheatham, Stone on Conflict of Laws, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 729 (1945). In
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 322-26, Justice Black wrote a separate opinion agreeing that
the court below had jurisdiction and protesting, as he did repeatedly in other contexts, that the
Constitution gave the Court no warrant to determine whether a state's exercise of power was
"reasonable" or in accord with "fair play and substantial justice." See supra text accompany-
ing notes 106-08, 147-51 (discussing Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 76 (1945) and
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)).
164. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
165. See id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
168. See D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 342-51, 384 (discussing the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
169. See id. at 390-92 (discussing the extension of equal protection to nonracial classifica-
tions); Taft, supra note 20, at 70-71 (discussing its application to voting in Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927)).
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mained to be seen. 170
Although the substantive issues raised by the complaint were extremely
challenging, the majority did not reach them. Justice Frankfurter, joined by
Justices Reed and Burton, concluded that the questions presented were "of a
peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determina-
tion."' 7 ' Rutledge, the only other Justice participating, concluded that the
complaint had been properly dismissed "for want of equity."' 172 Hence, by a
four-to-three vote, the judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed.
Earlier decisions had occasionally suggested that certain "political" ques-
tions were indeed beyond judicial ken. 173 The whole course of constitutional
decision, however, demonstrated that the mere fact that an issue was of
political significance did not bring it within that category. Though some of
the opinions were foggy, the Court seemed largely to have held that certain
matters lay within the discretion of other governmental bodies' 74 and that
the section of article IV by which the United States guaranteed to each state
a republican form of government, as its text suggested, gave the citizen no
enforceable rights. 175
Justice Frankfurter's most concrete argument was that article I gave Con-
gress authority to revise state regulations governing the time, place, and
manner of congressional elections,' 76 but explicit congressional authority to
enforce the Civil War amendments 77 had never been held to oust courts of
ordinary jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of state action under
them. Furthermore, since it was Congress that was allegedly malappor-
tioned, there was a particularly hollow ring to Justice Frankfurter's conten-
170. Justice Black also invoked article I's requirement that members of the House be "cho-
sen . . . by the People of the several States," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, which obviously
required some interpretation before it could be said to outlaw the apportionment in question.
See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 570 (Black, J., dissenting).
171. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
172. Id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
173. See D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 67 & n.19, 252-57 (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-71 (1803) and Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)); Hughes
I, supra note 3, at 554 n.223 (discussing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)).
174. E.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 421 (1839) (President's au-
thority to recognize foreign sovereignty), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 253 n. 121;
see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 137. The foggiest decision of all, Coleman, 307 U.S. at
433, can be viewed as holding that the Constitution imposed no limit on the time for ratifica-
tion of an amendment and did not forbid ratification after rejection, though the Court also
spoke more vaguely about the lack of judicially manageable standards for decision. See id. at
453-55.
175. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S.
118, 143-51 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
176. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1).
177. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
[Vol. 37:39
The Preferred-Position Debate
tion that "[t]he remedy for unfairness in districting" was "to invoke the
ample powers of Congress."' 78 In fact, Colegrove was a classic illustration of
Chief Justice Stone's wisdom in suggesting a special need for judicial review
to assure the proper functioning of "those political processes which can ordi-
narily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." 79
Chief Justice Stone died suddenly in April 1946, shortly before Colegrove
was decided. Someone must have known how he would have voted in the
case, since it had been argued before his death. One likes to think he would
have voted with Justice Black to determine the case on its merits, since it
was he who had pointed out in Carolene Products that the integrity of the
democratic process was the crucial assumption on which deference to the
political branches rested. 18
0
Nothing in Justice Frankfurter's brief opinion seems sufficient to justify a
refusal to determine the impact of the equal protection clause in such a con-
text. He would make a much more elaborate effort to do so some sixteen
years later in Baker v. Carr. 181 For now let it suffice that, popular impres-
sions to the contrary notwithstanding, Frankfurter lost on this issue in Cole-
grove. In providing the decisive vote for dismissal on the ground that it
might be too late for the petitioners to obtain effective relief before the im-
pending election, Justice Rutledge made clear that he thought precedent es-
tablished that the questions raised were justiciable.182
V. CONCLUSION
Stone's brief tenure as Chief Justice was a time of tall Justices-Stone
himself, Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson, to name only the most illustrious.
Seldom have so many gifted Justices graced the institution at the same time.
It was a time of great victories and of great disappointments. Great blows
were struck for freedom in such inspiring opinions as Duncan v.
Kanahamoku 183 and Ex parte Endo, 184 Cramer v. United States185 and Es-
178. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556. Justice Frankfurter also suggested that voters might "se-
cure State legislatures that will apportion properly," id., but those legislatures were appor-
tioned in the same way and therefore no more likely than Congress to give away the excessive
power of their incumbents. See id. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting).
179. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
180. Justice Murphy's biographer reports that "only one Justice" (not Black, Murphy, or
Rutledge) voted to intervene when Colegrove was first discussed in conference, and that Justice
Black initially had the "assignment" of writing to deny justiciability. See J. HOWARD, supra
note 46, at 484 & n.C.
181. 369 U.S. 186, 266-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
182. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 564-65 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
183. 327 U.S. 304 (1946), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 8-9.
184. 323 U.S. 283 (1944), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 19-20.
185. 325 U.S. 1 (1945), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 21-27.
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tep v. United States, 186 Martin v. City of Struthers 187 and West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 188 and Smith v. Allwright 9 and Marsh v.
Alabama. 190 Entire fields of law were modernized and clarified by the Chief
Justice's fine opinions in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 9' and International
Shoe Co. v. Washington. 192 The Court did what it could to curb the excesses
of war; but cases like Ex parte Quirin, 193 In re Yamashita, 194 Hirabayashi v.
United States, 195 and Korematsu v. United States 196 were sobering reminders
both of the limits of judicial review and of the responsibility of other
branches for safeguarding fundamental liberties. 97 Colegrove v. Green 198
postponed for a generation the correction of the glaring anomaly of malap-
portionment, and Betts v. Brady' 99 prevented for the same period fulfillment
of the promise of fair trial the Court had made ten years before.
It was a time of vigorous disagreement among the Justices, most notably
over the question of heightened scrutiny of measures affecting "specific"
constitutional prohibitions, political processes, and insular minorities that
Stone had raised in his perceptive footnote in United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co.2° To a substantial extent Stone's view had already prevailed,
though the battle was not to be fully won until Justice Frankfurter's retire-
ment in 1962. As leading spokesmen for the two competing views, Justices
Black and Frankfurter, like Justices Field and Miller three-quarters of a cen-
201 ~ ftury before, squared off in 1946 for another decade and a half of intense
controversy over the most fundamental questions of judicial authority.
It was a time, finally, to celebrate the career of a truly extraordinary mem-
ber of the Court. In his twenty years on the Bench, Harlan F. Stone had
done more peihaps than any other Justice to bring constitutional law into
the twentieth century.20 2 We are indebted to him for one of the most effec-
186. 327 U.S. 114 (1946), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 33-37.
187. 319 U.S. 141 (1943); see also supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
188. 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
189. 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see also supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
190. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see also supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
191. 325 U.S. 761 (1945); see also supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
192. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
193. 317 U.S. 1 (1942), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 4-5.
194. 327 U.S. 1 (1946), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 5-7.
195. 320 U.S. 81 (1943), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 9-15.
196. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), discussed in Stone I, supra note 1, at 15-19.
197. See generally Stone I, supra note 1.
198. 328 U.S. 549 (1946); see also supra notes 164-82 and accompanying text.
199. 316 U.S. 455 (1942); see also supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
200. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), discussed in Hughes I, supra note 3, at 546.
201. See D. CURRIE, supra note 6, at 537-58.
202. See A. MASON, supra note 144, at 777 ("In a logical, as well as a chronological, sense
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tive protests against the old order,20 3 as well as the authoritative program of
the new. He almost singlehandedly wrote the modern law of intergovern-
mental immunity, commerce clause preemption, full faith and credit, extra-
territorial taxation, and personal jurisdiction. 2°' Next to Marshall and
Holmes, Stone may well have been the most influential Justice yet to have
presided on the Supreme Court.
Stone was the one who, in both the old and the new Court, carried the Holmes-Brandeis
tradition to its fruition.").
203. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-88 (1936), discussed in Hughes 1, supra
note 3, at 530-36; see also Wechsler, Stone and the Constitution, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 764, 777
(1945) ("In the battle that followed [the Butler dissent] was the standard of attack.").
204. See Cheatham, supra note 163, at 733 ("[S]ince Story wrote his great treatise over one
hundred years ago no member of the court has contributed more than the late Chief Justice to
conflict of laws."): Magill, Stone on Taxation, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 747, 752, 763 (1945) ("Mr.
Justice Stone's operations in the field of state jurisdiction to tax intangibles . . . contributed
much to the establishment of sensible rules .... He put intergovernmental tax relations on a
sound basis.").
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